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Abstract: The role and scope of the state’s activities in the field of social security 
are quite often problematic. This is related both to the attitude of citizens and to the 
use of social slogans, particularly in election campaigns. One could say that the elec-
toral struggle is a kind of race, in which the winner is the politician or party whose 
promises are best suited to their voters. In order to address social security, politicians 
manipulate economic data. But above all, the influence of electoral promises (usually 
narrowed down to matters of welfare) on the evolution of the political system is not 
considered, despite the fact that this influence is considerable and very often neglect-
ed, as exemplified by the situation in the Republic of Poland after 2015.
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One of the common issues present in public debate is the role and scope of the activity of the state in the area of social security. This is 
connected both with citizens’ attitudes and with the use of social slogans, 
especially in election campaigns. It might even be said that the battle for 
votes is a kind of race in which candidates try to outdo one another in the 
social promises made to voters, thanks to which a politician/party may 
succeed in the elections. Thus, when using the slogan of social security, 
politicians manipulate economic data and, more importantly, disregard 
the sphere of the influence of electoral promises concerning social issues 
(usually limited to social welfare) on the evolution of the political system. 
There is no doubt that this influence is significant and often ignored, an 
example of which is the Republic of Poland after 2015.
Social security is defined as any legal and organizational activities 
undertaken both on the national and international level which “are aimed 
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at ensuring that people, families and social groups enjoy a specific liv-
ing standard and are not marginalized and socially excluded.” It is an 
indispensable element of electoral efforts taken by all actors of the po-
litical game (Leszczyński, 2011, pp. 57–59). It is usually the state that 
is considered the institution responsible for the sphere of social security. 
Such an approach seems to be oversimplified, though. What is more, the 
issue is used for promoting the electoral program of a specific political 
actor. We may thus risk the thesis that the sphere of social security has 
become an election tool which is mainly applied to persuade voters to 
support a given group or candidate. It should be emphasized, however, 
that adopting such a narrow attitude to the problem hampers the growth 
of society. It must be remembered that citizens also play a significant role 
in the development of social security. Therefore, in order to achieve the 
established social goals, responsibility should be shared between the gov-
ernment and citizens. Otherwise, people will become helpless and will 
express their claims to the authorities, thereby losing their ability to cope 
with hardships: job loss, natural disasters, etc. At the same time, “inability 
in dealing with life” may lead to over-reliance on social welfare and, con-
sequently (due to excessive burdens), may make the state withdraw from 
the sphere of pro-social activity.
However, it is neither misjudgment nor a simple manipulation by politi-
cians. The existing body of literature on internal and national security often 
reduces their social dimension to social welfare and the related tasks of the 
state. Thus, it ignores other significant aspects of social security, such as so-
cial capital, which encompasses qualifications, knowledge, skills, etc. What 
is no less important is the sphere of community security, seen in the context 
of social capital and the culture of social trust, civic activity and other ele-
ments associated with it, such as the ability to cooperate not only in crisis 
situations or the ability to shape civil society, which in turn contributes to 
a high degree of the consolidation of democracy. This does not mean that 
problems embedded in the conventional sphere of welfare security do not 
refer to its social dimension. It must be emphasized that although they are 
a significant component of social security, they only supplement its devel-
opment and community aspects (Leszczyński, 2011, p. 59).
It seems justifiable to state that it is not possible to manage welfare 
security effectively without the contribution of developmental elements, 
such as, for example, human capital. This capital, however, does not have 
much shaping potential if the society lacks the dimension of community 
security, whose integral part is social capital.
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There is no doubt that social security has a significant influence on the 
sphere of economic voting. As is well known, “the theory of economic 
voting was developed as a tool for describing a mechanism according 
to which the state of the economy, monitored by economic indicators, 
is a predictor of electoral support for those responsible for the economy, 
i.e. the government” (Markowski, Cześnik, Kotnarowski, 2015, p. 120). 
While we accept the validity of this theory, we must point out that the 
elites’ policy concerning economic issues affects society in the long-term. 
This is why its implications are often not directly associated with the de-
cisions made by the ruling party in the current term, but become evident 
in the next term (Turska-Kawa, 2015, p. 234).
At the same time, economic problems, ignored and marginalized by 
some and used as an element of manipulation in election campaigns by 
others, to a large degree determine the quality of social security – paying 
no heed to the aspects of development and community, they significant-
ly affect the welfare sphere, which remains to be managed by the state. 
Thus, we may risk the statement (as banal as it may seem) that the larger 
the scope of electoral promises concerning the area of social security, the 
more likely it is for a party to win the election. However, this statement 
(and sometimes a conviction) might entail certain problems.
The main one among them is the fact that economic voting is consid-
ered to be a sign of rational electoral behavior, which means that voters 
have knowledge of the economy and can reliably evaluate the state of 
the economy and electoral promises. This is quite an optimistic view of 
citizens’ competence with regard to the sphere of business, because, as 
Agnieszka Turska-Kawa rightly remarks, “economic issues are difficult 
areas – understanding them and relating them to other aspects of the so-
cial functioning of an individual requires people to have a certain level of 
competence, knowledge and insight into the social and economic reality” 
(Turska-Kawa, 2015, p. 212).
At the same time, it is assumed that voters are not whimsical when it 
comes to their economic choices and do not yield to opinions discrediting 
the actual achievements of the government in the economic sphere. As 
Radosław Markowski, Mikołaj Cześnik and Michał Kotnarowski point 
out, it is an ideal version of economic choice, verified by empirical re-
search. They indicate that “citizens may misperceive policy results and/or 
they may be wrong in their evaluation of political accountability. Incom-
petent, inexperienced or simply misinformed voters may punish politi-
cians and parties which do not really deserve it” (Cześnik, 2007, p. 120). 
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As a result, we observe that the authorities show disrespect to citizens’ 
economic aspirations, and that instead of a “qualitative exchange of infor-
mation signals between the elites and the masses, we witness politicians 
adapting to the superficial fancies of the public” (Cześnik, 2007, p. 120).
The situation presented above occurred in the campaign before the 
elections to the parliament of the Republic of Poland in 2015. We ob-
served that the issue of social security had been trivialized and limited 
to the sphere of the state’s responsibility for implementing it. What is 
more, as an implication of the above, political parties totally ignored 
the community perspective in their electoral manifestoes and largely 
reduced making references to the sphere connected with human capital. 
Thus, during the election campaign, parties responded to “social needs” 
and proposed a superficial “change,” referring only to the abovemen-
tioned “fancies” and “whims,” taking no account of the capabilities of 
individuals, communities, and, finally, of the state. At the same time, it 
must be emphasized that it is a consequence of the lack of the econom-
ic competence of Polish society, which tends to increase due to, quite 
paradoxically, political parties’ use of populist slogans and their lack 
of interest in the development of social capital and economic culture in 
Poland.
In this context, there is no denying that social electoral promises can 
be crucial for potential changes in the political system after an election 
has been won. According to Andrew Heywood, “the political system con-
sists of linkages between what are viewed as outputs [e.g. the govern-
ment’s policy] and inputs, i.e. demands and supports from the general 
public” (Heywood, 2009, pp. 30–31). This is why, as Simon Hix noted, 
the political system is characterized by four main components: a stable 
and clearly defined system of institutions for collective decision-making 
and a set of principles governing the interconnections of these institu-
tions and their internal structure; citizens and social groups satisfy their 
social needs through the political system in a direct way or through such 
organs as lobby groups and political parties; collective decisions in a po-
litical system have a significant impact on the distribution of resources, 
and social and political values in the system; and, finally, there is constant 
interaction between the results of political processes and new expecta-
tions regarding the system, new decisions, etc. (Hix, 2010, pp. 28–29). It 
should be noted that it is a continuation of theories proposed by Gabri-
ela Almond (Comparative	Political	Systems) and David Easton (An	Ap-
proach	to	the	Study	of	Political	Systems), who were first to establish the 
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formal framework for defining and analyzing political systems (in 1956 
and 1957, respectively) (Hix, 2010, pp. 28–29).
A similar research perspective was adopted by Andrzej Antoszewski 
and Ryszard Herbut, who believe that the category of a political system is 
not only the basis for theoretical deliberations. It is also one of the tasks 
of empirical political science, which studies, among others, “in what in-
stitutional framework the battle for power is fought, how this power is 
exercised and limited, and according to what principles those in power 
are held politically accountable. […] The research focuses on the fol-
lowing issues: electoral systems, institutions of the legislative and execu-
tive branches, political parties and party systems, and political behaviors” 
(Antoszewski, Herbut, 2007, pp. 9–10).
It must also be pointed out, as Mariusz Gulczyński emphasizes, that 
the following three basic research areas may be distinguished within the 
category of a political system: a set of the elements of the system, i.e. 
all institutions having political functions and mutually related; the “sur-
roundings” of the system, i.e. its sociological context – the phenomenon 
of the division of the society into groups, their mutual relations, forms of 
political activity; all relationships between a political system and its sur-
roundings (Gulczyński, 2004, p. 38).
This overview of the definitions of a political system – as brief as it is 
(due to the requirements concerning the research problem under discus-
sion) – allows us to identify mutual relations between the institutions of 
the system (for example, political parties, the government, the parliament, 
etc.) and the society. It should be added, as Niclas Luhmann notes, that, 
first of all, politics faces challenges resulting from the previously carried 
out policies, but one cannot forget that “all those that benefit from welfare 
security and who are taken care of by politicians cannot be expected to be 
constantly happy, grateful and politically loyal” (Luhmann, 1994, p. 22).
This is why it is so important to have democratic institutions perma-
nently rooted in citizens’ minds, so that no social electoral promises could 
lead to the devastation of the political regime. The process of the develop-
ment of democratic political institutions in Poland after 1989 had several 
stages. Andrzej Antoszewski, having analyzed the course of transforma-
tions, distinguished four periods:
 I – normative semi-presidential during Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski’s 
presidency (July 19, 1989 –December 30, 1989 – President of the 
People’s Republic of Poland; December 31, 1989–December 22, 
1990 – President of the Republic of Poland);
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 II – normative and actual presidential system during Lech Wałęsa’s 
presidency (December 22, 1990–December 22, 1995);
 III – limited semi-presidential system after the “small Constitution” en-
tered into force (The Constitutional Act of October 17, 1992) (De-
cember 8, 1992);
 IV – evolution towards a parliamentary system after the presidential 
election of 1995 (1st round: November 5, 1995, 2nd round: Novem-
ber 19, 1995) (Antoszewski, 1997, pp. 59–60; see also: Godlewski, 
2005, p. 132).
As far as the distinction of the above stages is concerned, it should be 
indicated that the course of transformation was determined by three prin-
cipal goals. Firstly, the political elites aimed to introduce a democratic, 
pluralistic political system through forming an infrastructure for multi-
party political competition.1 Secondly, the constitutional, institutional and 
procedural foundations for the development of participatory democracy 
were to be established (Mołdawa, 2007, p. 29).
This concept was reflected in the provisions of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997. In chapter I, entitled The	Republic, 
the following principles of the system are stipulated (it should be added 
that other articles of the fundamental law, especially those included in 
chapter II, also refer to these principles): the republican form of govern-
ment, a democratic state ruled by law, sovereignty of the nation, the sepa-
ration and balance of powers, political pluralism, political representation, 
a bicameral legislature, the mutual independence of the State and church-
es and other religious organizations, the freedom and rights of persons 
and citizens, the independence of the judiciary and judges, social market 
economy, economic freedom, and the protection of property (Skrzydło, 
2002, p. 57; see also: Zięba-Załucka, 1998, p. 9). The Republic ensures 
the implementation of the idea of self-government and the functioning 
of free, independent media. Equally importantly, the fundamental law 
also institutes civilian oversight of the armed forces (Żebrowski, 2006, 
p. 139).
Article 1 of the Constitution stipulates that “the Republic of Poland 
shall be the common good of all its citizens.” As Mirosław Karpiuk 
rightly notes, this constitutional principle attaches particular importance 
to the “directive of the protection of national security.” According to the 
1 For more details on the electoral system in Poland, see, for example: Glajcar, 
2016, pp. 344–382.
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researcher, the survival of the country and rescuing the nation is prag-
matically prior to other functions of the state as it determines the possibil-
ity of exercising them. Therefore, the state should protect the interests of 
citizens as long as it does not stand in contradiction to the social interest” 
(Karpiuk, 2012, p. 32).
According to Art. 2 of the binding Constitution, “the Republic of Po-
land is a democratic state ruled by law,2 and implementing the principles 
of social justice.” Seymour Martin Lipset defines democracy as a politi-
cal system which, on the basis of constitutional procedures, ensures the 
cyclical rotation of people in power, and which guarantees the existence 
of a wide, social mechanism securing influence on the decision-making 
process through selecting from among candidates for political positions 
(Lipset, 1995, p. 48).
As was mentioned earlier, the Constitution of Poland defines relations 
between the parliament, the government (Glajcar, 2015, p. 558), and the 
president in a way typical of the parliamentary-cabinet system. According 
to Maria Kruk-Jaroszowa, the system adopted in the Polish fundamental 
law, “along with elements alien to the classical parliamentary system3 
[…], takes its origin from the roots of parliamentary democracy and the 
parliamentary system” (Sarnecki, 2009, p. 286).
Parliamentary democracy is one of the kinds of the power of the peo-
ple in which the government leader and his/her cabinet is dependent on 
parliament’s trust. One of its features is also the separation of the head of 
state and the head of government, and close links between the executive 
and legislative branches. Drawing on the concepts of the science of law 
concerning the issue of parliamentary government, we must emphasize 
that the parliamentary system of government has been to a large degree 
shaped by parliament’s function of scrutiny.
As Hans Kelsen rightly said, “a judgment about parliamentarism de-
fines the democratic system of a state” (Pajdała, 2001, p. 59). Parliaments 
are the most important elements of democratic systems. It is they that 
are vested with the power to establish commonly binding legal norms. 
2 For more details see: Ryszka, 2002, pp. 119–123.
3 What can be seen as a certain departure from the classical form of the parliamenta-
ry-cabinet model are the constitutional regulations according to which the president, as 
the head of state, is elected by the nation in universal elections. Thus, he or she has direct 
legitimacy, which, however, does not correlate with the scope of his/her powers. In par-
liamentary systems, the president is usually elected by the parliament itself or deputies 
take part in the election procedure. See also: Gulczyński, Zaradny, 2000, p. 142.
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At present, the constitutional practice in democratic countries shows that 
– regardless of the regime – the executive organs, especially the govern-
ment, have gained more powers with regard to the state’s policy direc-
tions, including the exercise of the legislative function.4
The political system adopted in Poland, in accordance with the 
binding constitutional regulations, may be defined as rationalized 
parliamentarism,5 in which the parliament’s support is of fundamental 
importance. In other words, as long as the Sejm of the RP approves of the 
activity of the Council of Ministers, rationalizing elements will remain 
almost imperceptible. The rationalization of the parliamentary system 
consists in initiating some mechanisms of enhancing the scope of powers 
of the Council of Ministers and of the prime minister when there is insuf-
ficient support for the government in the parliament. This is when the 
instruments used for preventing the cabinet from being dismissed are ap-
plied (e.g. the institution of the constructive vote of no confidence, which 
serves the strengthening of the position of the government and prime min-
ister, the introduction of deadlines and larger majorities in the procedure 
of a vote of no confidence).6 To define a system governed by the articles 
of the Polish fundamental law, Marian Grzybowski uses the term mixed	
system. In his view, the Constitution of the RP combines the predominant 
elements of a rationalized parliamentary system with a strong position of 
the prime minister, adding some “borrowings” from the semi-presidential 
system (Grzybowski, 2012, p. 134).
In the system of parliamentary government adopted by the Polish fun-
damental law, there are two pillars: the parliament and the government, 
which are mutually related institutionally. In a democratic state ruled by 
law, constitutionally defined authorities function in the system of checks 
and balances. The Constitution grants each of them some specific areas of 
competence. It also has some instruments for influencing the activity of 
the other decision-making authorities. In accordance with the regulations 
which form the basis of the parliamentary-cabinet system, the law al-
lows for a certain area of mutual relationships, influences and overlapping 
competences, especially between the executive and legislative branches. 
The Sejm of the RP, apart from the leading role it plays in exercising 
the lawmaking function, may apply the mechanisms of scrutiny over the 
government’s activity.
4 For more details see: Marszałek-Kawa, 2012, pp. 323–380.
5 For more details on the political regime see: Lisicka, 2002, pp. 27–50.
6 See also: Gulczyński, Zaradny, 2000, p. 143.
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Under Article 95(2) of the fundamental law, “the Sejm shall exercise 
control over the activities of the Council of Ministers within the scope 
specified by the provisions of the Constitution and statutes.” Thus, the 
Sejm of the RP scrutinizes the organs of the executive directly and in-
directly in the name of the sovereign. The article quoted above makes 
a reference to Article 10 of the fundamental law. It must be once again 
emphasized here that both houses of parliament closely cooperate with 
each other when exercising the legislative function. The Constitution 
granted the Sejm the exclusive power of scrutiny over the government’s 
work. The Senate of the RP was excluded from this sphere of activity. 
Thus, although both houses have an equal position, such distribution of 
powers clearly shows the leading role of the Sejm. As has been stressed in 
the doctrine of the constitutional law, the Constitution of 1997 stipulated 
that the Senate and the Sejm were equal chambers, although the former 
did not enjoy the same rights as the latter (non-absolute bicameralism, 
asymmetric bicameralism) (Kruk, 2008, p. 24).
There is a “fragile culture of constitutionalism” in Poland. Accord-
ing to Ryszard Piotrowski, this opinion is confirmed by the quite com-
mon view that “the letter of the law takes precedence over its spirit.” 
In line with such an approach to constitutional principles, politicians 
quite frequently propose changes in the constitutional sphere, but their 
attempts have a short-term perspective (Piotrowski, 2009, pp. 21–24, 53; 
Chruściak, 2009, pp. 131–133) and have a clearly lexical and declara-
tive character. The representatives of the Polish political elites submit 
some typically practical proposals concerning the modernization of the 
fundamental law. They are driven by opportunistic motives and act out of 
self-interest, wanting to make political capital. It has little to do with real 
plans, which could lead to future amendments of the fundamental law. 
It should be added here that constitutionalists share a view that “even if 
all politicians’ proposals to amend the Constitution were adopted, they 
would not undermine the original foundations of the fundamental law, as 
they only cover quite a random part of the constitutional matter.” Ryszard 
Chruściak believes that this confirms the permanence of the binding Con-
stitution (2009, pp. 127–130).
The declarations concerning changes in the Constitution were also part 
of the parliamentary election campaign in 2015. This issue was particu-
larly raised by two political formations: Law and Justice and Kukiz’15. 
The proposed changes differed in scope, but the representatives of both 
parties were aware that they could succeed only if they won a “constitu-
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tional majority” in the parliament. It should be pointed out that neither 
Law and Justice nor Kukiz’15 were willing to form a parliamentary and 
cabinet coalition, while they clearly emphasized their readiness to coop-
erate in the area of fundamental constitutional changes.
The instrument that Law and Justice used in the election campaign 
was the issue of welfare security. In their public appearances, politicians 
of this party obviously addressed the problem of social security as well, 
but, as it was mentioned before, they actually focused on the sphere of 
welfare security. The fact that their election campaign was based on the 
slogans such as “500+” (a child benefit program), “mieszkanie+” (a pro-
gram of State assistance for people buying flats), “pomoc dla frankowic-
zów” (regulations to help people who took out mortgage loans in Swiss 
francs), lowering the retirement age or getting rid of junior high schools, 
meant that emphasis was placed on material and social factors. At the 
same time, issues related to changes in the Constitution were presented in 
the campaign as “constitutional abstractions concerning the elites” (Jan-
icki, Władyka, 2017, p. 13). The focus on welfare issues and raising the 
living standard of “ordinary Polish men and women” led to ignoring the 
constitutional sphere, which was seen as an auxiliary component in the 
functioning of the state.7
Thus, Law and Justice managed to win the support of the “average cit-
izen,” i.e. one that has fairly low civil competence and one, who, despite 
subjectively enjoying a much higher living standard, does not objectively 
belong to the richest people in the society. This group of citizens usually 
sees the elites in power as those who are responsible for their “low” stand-
ard of living and take the right to demand that their situation should be 
improved through the active efforts of the state in the economic and social 
spheres. As was pointed out earlier, people belonging to this group do not 
know much about the principles of economics, so they accept promises 
concerning the economic sphere and they force politicians to make such 
promises many a time.8
What we observe here is a kind of feedback, according to the rule 
of “entering,” “processing” and “exiting” the political system (Laska, 
Nocoń, 2005, p. 124). The implementation of electoral welfare prom-
ises made by Law and Justice in this case was connected both with the 
7 The authors ignore here the issue of Smolensk crash, quite strongly emphasized 
in the campaign, as it has nothing to do with the research problem in our delibera-
tions.
8 For example, through political pressure in the form of manifestations.
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election game and with the optimistic view of the state of the global 
economy, which definitely underpinned the party’s electoral declara-
tions. At the same time, the fact that voters focused on welfare issues 
made them divert their attention from the introduction of changes in the 
political system. This does not mean, however, that they completely lost 
interest in government policy. We might risk the statement that, follow-
ing decisions concerning changes in the political system of the country 
(the Constitutional Court, changes in the judiciary), we observed an in-
crease in the level of distrust in the society, which has become key to 
the development of citizens’ political competence. It should be added 
here that the culture of distrust in the society does not have to be a fac-
tor that negatively affects the quality of social security, thus influencing 
the level of the consolidation of democracy. Quite the contrary, it may 
have a positive impact on the phenomena indicated above. Thus, the 
fact that actors of the election game focus on welfare issues (from the 
whole portfolio of social security) may also positively influence these 
phenomena.
Contrary to the opinions that are quite widely held in Poland, distrust 
in the society was and still is a determinant of social development in two 
dimensions: liberal and democratic (Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 15). Liberal 
distrust is aimed, as Rosanvallon argues, at “establishing poor authorities 
and the institutionalization of suspiciousness” (Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 10). 
Thus, liberal distrust helps to form power in a way that would prevent au-
thoritarianism. This type of distrust in the society was one of the motives 
behind Montesquieu’s concept of the separation of powers (Montesquieu, 
1758, chapter XI, chapter IV). Thus, in this case, distrust first of all refers 
to being skeptical about the authorities, even those elected in universal 
elections, “by the will of the nation.”
What is more important for our deliberations, however, is the oth-
er type of distrust in the society, i.e. democratic distrust, the essence of 
which is “to make sure that the elected authorities keep their promises 
and to find resources for maintaining the original requirements concern-
ing service for the common good” (Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 11). This may 
be organized in a number of ways – through the social oversight of the 
authorities, piling up obstacles (e.g. strikes and protests), or appealing 
to judicial power (e.g. through a class action for not keeping electoral 
promises). This form of distrust in the society is referred to as a new kind 
of democracy – counter-democracy, which acquires the form of organized 
distrust (Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 11).
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For some political scientists, e.g. Rosanvallon quoted above or Iwan 
Krastew, the culture of distrust forms the foundation of modern democ-
racies. It is a consequence of the erosion of three spheres of the activity 
of the individual and society: scientific, economic and sociological. The 
complication of these fields of activity (as mentioned earlier) leads to 
a decrease in social trust, but, at the same time, it reduces its importance 
in social and individual life. Thus, we are beginning to live and function 
in a culture of distrust in the society, which is paradoxically conducive 
to the development of democracy, or counter-democracy, as Rosanvallon 
calls it. However, if it is to acquire real dimensions, i.e. citizens’ distrust, 
it must become participatory, not only in its traditional aspect, but also in 
the unconventional form, which is often ignored when different ways of 
civic participation are analyzed. While we observe people’s growing un-
willingness to take part in elections, both in the world and in Poland, we 
should also emphasize that different forms of democratic influence, such 
as strikes, protests and petition signing, are becoming increasingly popu-
lar. In principle, it is these forms of participation that show the importance 
of distrust in the society. That is why it is difficult to disagree with the 
statements that the “passive citizen is a mythical figure,” and that “while 
electoral democracy has been undoubtedly eroded, the democracies of ex-
pression, implication and intervention have developed and strengthened” 
(Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 19).
Therefore, what seemed to be the easiest way of gaining power – ap-
pealing to a part of social security – its welfare aspect – may become the 
beginning of the end of the winners of the last elections. If a party cannot 
keep its electoral promises, even if this happens due to objective reasons, 
a citizen who is poorly educated in the field of economy will assess the 
authorities for what they have failed to do.
After a few months since Law and Justice came to power, we find 
numerous examples of the above. Economic electoral promises have 
not been reflected in the decisions and actions of the ruling majority in 
Poland. On the other hand, its activity in the political sphere (changes 
concerning the Constitutional Court, mass media, civil service, etc.) has 
led to the erosion of democratic trust and has significantly contributed 
to the strengthening of social capital, the expression of which are un-
conventional kinds of participation in the form of social protests. While 
we agree with those scholars who assert that Polish people have poor 
economic competence, and thus often vote for the parties that offered the 
“best welfare package” in the election campaign, we also have to point 
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out that welfare proposals and the promises that the state will show more 
involvement in implementing them, have not made the society give up its 
freedoms and democratic rights. Thus, quite paradoxically, the part of the 
election manifesto which contributed to Law and Justice’s success may 
also become the cause of its defeat in the next election.
There are two premises to support this thesis. Firstly, the condition of 
the finances of the state, which does not allow any forms of “distribution” 
and pandering to the economic “whims” of voters. Secondly, the steps 
made in the political sphere unambiguously show that election promises 
first of all served to “hide” political and cultural proposals. It was a very 
simple form of electoral manipulation, which, from a short-term perspec-
tive, must be deemed unsuccessful. It has led to the creation of networks 
that became the foundation of social capital which stood up for democ-
racy. Thus, contrary to the expectations of political actors, “pre-election 
bread and circuses” served in the campaign before the parliamentary elec-
tions will be the basis for holding the authorities accountable. Putting 
emphasis only on the role of the state in shaping social security may be 
counter-effective.
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Bezpieczeństwo społeczne jako czynnik ewolucji systemu politycznego  
w Polsce po wyborach parlamentarnych w 2015 roku 
 
Streszczenie
W debacie publicznej dość często występującym problemem jest rola i zakres 
działań państwa w obszarze bezpieczeństwa społecznego. Związane to jest zarówno 
z postawą obywateli, jak i wykorzystywaniem haseł społecznych, szczególnie w kam-
paniach wyborczych. Można wręcz powiedzieć, że w trakcie walki wyborczej nastę-
puje pewnego rodzaju wyścig polegający na tym, które obietnice socjalne trafią do 
przekonania wyborców, dzięki czemu polityk/partia polityczna osiągnie sukces wy-
borczy. Tym samym, odwołując się do hasła bezpieczeństwa społecznego, manipuluje 
się danymi ekonomicznymi, ale przede wszystkim pozostawia się poza sferą refleksji 
wpływ obietnic wyborczych ze sfery społecznej (zazwyczaj zawężanej do socjalnej) 
na ewolucję systemu politycznego. Niewątpliwie jest on znaczny i bardzo często lek-
ceważony, czego przykładem może być Rzeczpospolita Polska po 2015 roku.
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